

H5Re 1167 file
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Act with a very considerable inflationary potential.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that from the standpoint of the Administration's program, there is no objection to the submission of this letter.

Sincerely,

PETER J. BRENNAN,
Secretary of Labor.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION,
Washington, D.C., November 21, 1974.

HON. CARL T. CURTIS,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR CURTIS: I have your recent letter calling attention to the fact that the Senate will shortly consider the Conference Report on H.R. 8193, the Energy Security Act of 1974, and asking for my independent opinion on the legislation's inflationary potential should it be enacted.

The bill would require that by June 30, 1977, thirty percent of all United States petroleum imports be transported in U.S. flag vessels. The Secretary of Commerce is given appropriate authority to administer the legislation.

As you know, there are no provisions in the bill that directly affect the functions of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Certainly, we share with you your concern about the legislation's possible inflationary impact. Statistics show that transportation prices of modes subject to our jurisdiction have been far less inflationary than the average for the overall economy. We feel that this, in part, can be explained because of our examination of productivity in reviewing proposed rate increases.

Since the modes that we regulate consume substantial quantities of fuel we do have concern about the possibility of increased cost. For instance, trucks in this country consume approximately 550,000 barrels of diesel fuel daily, of which 40 percent is used by regulated trucking. Railroads use approximately 270,340 barrels of diesel fuel daily. This fuel usage data reflects an area of general concern over the impact of the proposed legislation on the modes we regulate, inasmuch as any increase in the price of diesel fuel would have a substantial impact on transportation costs. Ultimately, it would appear that such costs would likely be borne by consumers, as these additional costs triggered rate increase proposals. . . .

Finally, it is apparent that this legislation would stimulate shipbuilding. Although this would provide jobs, it would exacerbate the current steel shortage. Domestic modes of transport—particularly the railroads—could be subject to further delays in obtaining new equipment. If this were to occur, it would hinder our present efforts to improve car service in the railroad industry, such as through the medium of the proceeding in Ex Parte No. 241, *Investigation of Adequacy of Freight Car Ownership*. At the same time, any increases in steel shortages and prices generated by these new demands would likewise make it more difficult for the railroads to meet the needed levels of track replacement. Such effects would be contrary to our goal to attack the problem of "deferred maintenance" on the railroads, as recently illustrated by the conditions that we adopted in Ex Parte No. 305, *Nationwide Increase of Ten Percent in Freight Rates and Charges, 1974*. We also have concern as to what shortages might do to our present effort to restructure and restore the rail system in the Northeast to an economic, efficient system.

I trust that the above will be of some use to you in the Senate's deliberations on H.R. 8193.

Sincerely yours,
GEORGE M. STAFFORD,
Chairman.

HARRIS TRUST AND SAVINGS BANK,

Chicago, Ill., November 19, 1974.

HON. CARL T. CURTIS,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: Thank you for your inquiry concerning the inflation impact of HR8193. I am sorry I have not been able to respond sooner due to an extended business trip.

I am certainly of the view that this Bill should be defeated for the reasons presented in the Chamber of Commerce paper. It would reduce the efficiency of our economy, would add to inflationary pressures and would create an unfortunate precedent that might lead to retaliation by other countries.

I appreciate your interest in this matter and you certainly have my wholehearted support and efforts to avoid the legal requirements that 30% of all oil imports be carried in U.S. built tankers.

Sincerely,

BERYL W. SPRINKEL,
Executive Vice President.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE COMMUNICATION ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD CYPRUS

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, on October 25 I wrote to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger to inquire about U.S. policy toward Cyprus and the eastern Mediterranean area. My inquiry followed the submission of a report by a special study mission sent to Cyprus by the Subcommittee on Refugees, which I serve as chairman. In light of the findings of the study mission, I submitted to the Department of State a series of questions on U.S. policy toward the Cyprus crisis, as well as a list of recommendations prepared by the study mission.

This past week I received a lengthy response from the Department which I would like, Mr. President, to share with my colleagues in the Senate. Regrettably, the Department's communication raises as many questions as it answers.

Particularly troubling is the Department's response to my questions concerning continued U.S. military assistance to Turkey. There is evidence, Mr. President, that the Congress and the American people have once again been misled regarding our foreign military assistance program.

Despite assurances given in Ankara to the Refugee Subcommittee's study mission that there was no change in the rate of delivery of U.S. military hardware to Turkey during, or subsequent to, Turkey's invasion of Cyprus—and contrary to the clear signals from Congress against more aid to Turkey at this time, and the prohibitions of law—we learn today that the administration has actually escalated military aid to Turkey, despite the lack of progress in negotiations.

According to the Department of State's figures, over \$40,000,000 in military hardware was shipped to Turkey in the first quarter—July to September—of this fiscal year. And this is a sharp increase over the quarterly shipments earlier this year and, if the administration has its way, the United States will deliver \$218 million in military aid to

Turkey, an increase of nearly \$31 million over last year.

And all indicators suggest, Mr. President, that the heavy shipments of American arms to Turkey continues today, despite the continued lack of progress in negotiations over Cyprus. The President was given time by Congress to further negotiations. But he has used that time to ship more arms to Turkey, without any visible progress toward negotiations.

The Department's response expresses optimism over "moving the parties involved on Cyprus to early negotiations," but other parts of their response contradicts this hope. For example, the Department clearly does not anticipate any early "gesture of goodwill" by Turkey to break the deadlock over negotiations, especially a gesture which would permit a substantial number of refugees to return to their homes. Yet, they acknowledge that this is an "essential prerequisite."

Mr. President, the Department's response also reveals that the administration continues to refuse to tell Congress and the American people whether it was illegal to ship military aid to Turkey following its invasion of Cyprus. In response to my specific question as to the Department's final conclusion of its review of the legality of U.S. military aid to Turkey, they write:

After carefully weighing the legal and foreign policy considerations, the Administration decided that it was impossible publicly to express a legal conclusion on the issue of Turkey's eligibility for further assistance and sales without undermining our foreign policy objective of persuading Turkey and Greece to enter into direct negotiations for a solution of the Cyprus problem." (italics added)

It would appear, Mr. President, that the Department's refusal to state publicly its finding regarding the legality of military aid to Turkey, prior to the enactment on October 17 of the continuing resolution (H.J. Res. 1167), is tacit admission that it does in fact believe it was a violation of law to ship military hardware to Turkey after July 20. Furthermore, the Department fails to respond to my inquiry over the rate of delivery of U.S. military aid to Turkey in October and November of this year, after congressional action on the issue.

Mr. President, in order to share with my colleagues the Department's communication on U.S. policy toward the Cyprus crisis, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of my letter of October 25, and the Department's response on November 22, with enclosures, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letters and enclosures were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

OCTOBER 25, 1974.

HON. HENRY A. KISSINGER,
Secretary of State, Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As you know, there is continuing and, I feel, growing Congressional and public concern over the course of American policy towards recent developments on Cyprus. Of special concern to many Americans are the refugee and related humani-

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jected to numerous indignities typical for anyone voicing a desire to leave the Soviet Union.

Since 1969, neither Slepak nor his wife nor any other member of the family has been able to obtain employment. Slepak is listed as a "parasite," a term of Soviet bureaucratic jargon indicating a person who does not work—even if his failure to obtain work is official policy. For his "parasitism," Slepak is repeatedly picked up by the police for questioning, and he has been in and out of jail numerous times. His telephone has been disconnected.

Additionally, Soviet authorities have told Slepak that he may not leave the Soviet Union because he is in possession of sensitive information in his field. This is difficult to believe since he has not worked in his field for 5 years, and his knowledge is surely now obsolete.

CARGO PREFERENCE

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, the evidence continues to build up against H.R. 8193. As I have from time to time reported to the Senate, there appears to be almost unanimity among scholars and other interested people that this bill, the Energy Transportation Security Act or the so-called oil cargo preference bill, is highly inflationary. One aspect that I think needs attention is that many proponents of this legislation have tried to say it would help the workers of this country.

I would like to quote from the letter I received recently from the Secretary of Labor, Peter Brennan, where he points out that it will be the American worker who will suffer most from the inflationary impact of H.R. 8193:

I share your concern over inflation. It has been a heavy burden to the American workers. I believe the bill will indeed mean increased costs to the American consumers, but since estimates of the cost of the bill depend on assumptions about the availability of and charter rates for foreign flag ships, it would be difficult for me to confirm the estimates provided you already.

Yet, I am persuaded that any reasonable modification of the estimates in the enclosures to your letter would still leave the Act with a very considerable inflationary potential.

Also the Secretary of Transportation, Mr. Claude S. Brinegar, wrote an excellent analysis of the inflationary impact of this bill. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that his letter and the attachment thereto be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter and attachment were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION,
Washington, D.C., November 21, 1974.
HON. CARL T. CURTIS,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR CURTIS: This is in further response to your letter of October 29, requesting Departmental views on the inflationary potential of H.R. 8193, the Energy Transportation Security Act of 1974.

This bill would require that at least 20% of the gross tonnage of all oil imported in bulk into the United States on ocean vessels be transported in privately owned United

States flag commercial vessels. The amount required to be so carried would be increased to 25% after June 30, 1975, and to 30% after June 30, 1977, if the Secretary of Commerce determines prior to those effective dates that there will be adequate United States tonnage available to carry the required quantities of oil.

The Department agrees with the appraisal of the cost of the legislation prepared by the Federal Energy Administration, as well as the analysis of the economic impact of the bill prepared by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce—both of which were enclosed with your letter. Attached is a summary of our views on the inflationary and other related consequences should H.R. 8193 become law.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this legislation. It is my hope that the Senate will consider carefully these views before voting on the conference report on the bill.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that from the standpoint of the Administration's program, there is no objection to the submission of this letter.

Sincerely,

CLAUDE S. BRINEGAR.

DOT POSITION ON INFLATIONARY AND RELATED CONSEQUENCES OF H.R. 8193

Passage of the pending oil cargo preference legislation would have an adverse impact on the U.S. economy and on U.S.-foreign relations.

INFLATIONARY CONSEQUENCES

The proposed legislation would contribute to inflationary pressure both in the construction and operation of U.S.-flag tankers.

SHIP CONSTRUCTION

The current U.S. shipbuilding program has stretched the limits of U.S. shipyard capacity in the construction of large tankers. The proposed legislation would create an even greater demand for such ships and for the steel used in their construction which is already in short supply. This would be expected to result in higher prices, thus contributing to inflation.

SHIP OPERATION

By creating a restricted market with limited competition, U.S.-flag tanker operators would be able to charge very high rates for the carriage of oil imports. With widespread reports of excess capacity in oil tankers throughout the world, this legislation will not only contribute to the excess tonnage, but would preclude U.S. consumers from taking advantage of foreign tankers at low rates.

If there is no system of equalizing fuel costs throughout the nation, much of the added costs of cargo preference would be borne by those U.S. regions that rely heavily on oil imports, such as New England, the Middle Atlantic States, the West Coast, and Hawaii, and would be passed on to the consumer. Such an increase could be reflected in the cost of aviation and automotive fuels, electricity, and heating, as well as in the cost of manufactured and processed goods.

INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

Proponents of the legislation claim that cargo preference is used by many other nations, and this is certainly true. However, the enactment of this legislation which would apply U.S. cargo preference to commercial cargoes for the first time on a permanent basis, could serve as an example for foreign countries to increase their support for national flag shipping through discrimination.

Enactment of the legislation might put additional stress on our relations with other maritime nations and violate U.S. treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with more than twenty countries.

Because higher oil costs raise the cost of

U.S. production, passage of the legislation would run counter to current U.S. efforts to increase exports and improve our balance of payments posture. Furthermore, its passage would result in the creation of that type of trade barrier which this nation has traditionally opposed while generally advocating the liberalization of international commerce.

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, Mr. George M. Stafford, Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission, hinted in a letter to me about the inflationary ripple effect this legislation will have on the economy. He said:

Since the modes that we regulate consume substantial quantities of fuel we do have concern about the possibility of increased cost. For instance, trucks in this country consume approximately 550,000 barrels of diesel fuel daily, of which 40 percent is used by regulated trucking. Railroads use approximately 270,340 barrels of diesel fuel daily. This fuel usage data reflects an area of general concern over the impact of the proposed legislation on the modes we regulate, inasmuch as any increase in the price of diesel fuel would have a substantial impact on transportation costs. Ultimately, it would appear that such costs would likely be borne by consumers, as these additional costs triggered rate increase proposals. . . . We also have concern as to what shortages (steel) might do to our present effort to restructure and restore the rail system in the Northeast to an economic, efficient system.

Mr. Beryl W. Spinkel, executive vice president and economist of the Harris Trust and Savings Bank, said of the bill in his letter:

I am certainly of the view that this Bill should be defeated for the reasons presented in the Chamber of Commerce paper. It would reduce the efficiency of our economy, would add to inflationary pressures and would create an unfortunate precedent that might lead to retaliation by other countries. I appreciate your interest in this matter and you certainly have my wholehearted support and efforts to avoid the legal requirements that 30% of all oil imports be carried in U.S. built tankers.

I ask unanimous consent that both letters be printed in full in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
Washington, D.C., November 27, 1974.
HON. CARL T. CURTIS,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR CURTIS: This responds to your October 29 letter and enclosures, requesting my comments on the inflationary potential of H.R. 8193, the Energy Transportation Security Act of 1974. That bill would require up to 30 percent of all U.S. oil imports to be carried on U.S. built and registered tankers. The enclosures to your letter, prepared by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Federal Energy Administration, indicate that this legislation might cost United States citizens \$25 billion to \$30 billion over the ten-year period 1975-85.

I share your concern over inflation. It has been a heavy burden to the American workers. I believe the bill will indeed mean increased costs to the American consumers, but since estimates of the cost of the bill depend on assumptions about the availability of and charter rates for foreign flag ships, it would be difficult for me to confirm the estimates provided you already.

Yet, I am persuaded that any reasonable modification of the estimates in the enclosures to your letter would still leave the

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tarian problems resulting from Turkish military operations on the island.

In this connection, the Subcommittee on Refugees has conducted two days of hearings with Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Arthur A. Hartman, and a three member Study Mission, representing the Subcommittee recently traveled to the island to survey humanitarian needs. I have also introduced a foreign aid amendment, prepared in cooperation with officials in the Executive Branch, which, among other things, would authorize humanitarian assistance to Cyprus.

With the full cooperation of the Department, the Subcommittee's Study Mission traveled to Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean in late August and early September, and recently they filed a report of their findings and recommendations. The report has been informally made available to officials in the Executive Branch, and some conversations have followed between members of the Department's Cyprus Task Force and the Study Mission. The findings and recommendations focus on humanitarian issues, but they also include material on the broader aspects of United States policy towards Cyprus. A copy of the recommendations is enclosed, and I would appreciate very much getting the Department's detailed comments on the Study Mission's views and suggestions. I would also appreciate the Department's comment and views on the enclosed series of questions based on the hearings with Assistant Secretary Hartman and additional inquiry of the Subcommittee.

In light of the urgent humanitarian problems on Cyprus, and the intense congressional and public interest in developments on the island, I am extremely hopeful, Mr. Secretary, that the Subcommittee can anticipate a response to the enclosed inquiries within the next ten days. Many thanks for your consideration, and I look forward to hearing from you soon.

Sincerely,

EDWARD M. KENNEDY,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Refugees.

NOVEMBER 22, 1974.

DEAR SENATOR KENNEDY: Knowing that you would be anxious to have a reply before he returns from his current trip to the Far East, Secretary Kissinger has asked that I answer the questions contained in your letter of October 25 concerning current U.S. views and policies regarding Cyprus. We had hoped to get a response off to you sooner. However, I hope you will understand that the fluidity of the situation, the comprehensive nature of your questions, and our desire to give as full a response as possible prevented us from doing so.

The Secretary would like you to know that he fully shares your concern over Cyprus—both as a humanitarian and political problem. The Secretary would also like you to know that he is urgently concerned that Congress and the Administration work together and that he stands ready to cooperate as fully as possible with you and your colleagues.

Should you have any further questions, we would be happy to answer them informally with your staff, or more formally through testimony before your Subcommittee on Refugees.

Cordially,

LINWOOD HOLTON,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional
Relations.

ENCLOSURE

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON U.S. POLICY
TOWARD CYPRUS FROM CORRESPONDENCE
BETWEEN SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY
AND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

(1) Generally define the objectives and content of current United States policy toward Cyprus.

Answer: "The United States has four principal objectives in Cyprus: a) to support the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Cyprus; b) to relieve the human suffering on the island caused by the tragic outbreak of fighting this summer; c) to achieve a negotiated settlement which will enable all Cypriots to live in peace and security; and d) to remove Cyprus as an irritant in Greek-Turkish relations, and as a source of instability in the Eastern Mediterranean.

"Thousands of Cypriots have been displaced from their homes, and this means that we view movement on the Cyprus issue as much from a humanitarian as from a political standpoint. To meet urgent humanitarian needs, the United States has contributed over \$10.5 million to the international relief effort (including \$7.3 million toward the UNHCR's \$22 million appeal), has actively supported the UNHCR appeal by urging other countries to respond generously, and has sent disaster relief specialists to the field to coordinate U.S. assistance, assess relief needs on a continuing basis, and advise how we can most usefully be of assistance in the coming months.

"Throughout the present crisis we have urged moderation and restraint on the parties, worked to foster a climate for negotiations, and actively supported the intercommunal talks between Acting President Clerides and Vice President Denktash. These talks have achieved agreement on a number of important humanitarian issues and have established an essential framework for broadened discussions on a political settlement. We have also explored in detail with the parties directly involved ways in which these broader discussions might be facilitated.

"The negotiating process has, to be sure, moved more slowly than we had hoped. Nevertheless, our efforts to advance this process continue. The elections in Greece which have given Prime Minister Caramanlis a substantial majority and the designation of yet-to-be-confirmed new government in Ankara give promise of moving the parties involved on Cyprus to early negotiations."

(2) Apart from the Cypriot intercommunal talks between Acting President Clerides and Vice President Denktash, generally define the current status of negotiations over Cyprus.

a. Does the United States anticipate a resumption of the Geneva talks? Are alternative formats, involving other governments or NATO or the United Nations, possible or desirable?

Answer: "a) Our current efforts are aimed at facilitating broadened discussions within the framework of the Clerides-Denktaş talks. We anticipate that at some stage Greece and Turkey will participate more directly in the discussions, and this could of course involve a Geneva-type framework. At this time, however, we have no fixed ideas on the type of framework that would be more appropriate, other than our general view that a smaller forum involving only the parties directly involved is likely to be more productive than a larger forum."

b. In his October 14 message to Congress, the President stated that "the United States is making every effort to play a useful role in assisting the parties to a resolution of the Cyprus dispute." Define and characterize these efforts and the kind of "useful role" the United States is or anticipates undertaking to encourage and facilitate "a resolution of the Cyprus dispute."

Answer: "b) We believe we have played a useful supporting role in the effort to move the negotiating process forward. The Secretary has met with the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, and with Archbishop Makarios on several occasions in an effort to develop a dialogue, identify

areas of possible agreement, and sustain momentum toward negotiations."

c. In his September 26 testimony before the Refugee Subcommittee, Assistant Secretary Hartman repeatedly spoke of American efforts to find and suggest "common ground", between the parties to the Cyprus dispute, in order to facilitate a resumption of negotiations. What should Congress and the American people understand by "common ground"? What, in the Department's view, are the ingredients of this "common ground" in light of the Turkish occupation and what is the appropriate basis for negotiations?

Answer: "c) The 'common ground' to which Assistant Secretary Hartman referred in his September 26 testimony before the Refugee Subcommittee is an expandable concept. In the early stages of the crisis, the only 'common ground' was the belief of all parties that the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Cyprus should be maintained and that the crisis should be resolved through negotiations. Now the common ground includes agreement by Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus on the November 1 UN Resolution which outlines some of the essential subjects that will have to be addressed in any future negotiated agreement."

d. Earlier, at a news conference on August 19, Secretary Kissinger spoke of the need for Turkey "to display flexibility and a concern for Greek sensitivities. . . ." What should Congress and the American people understand by the need for Turkey "to display flexibility and a concern for Greek sensitivities"? Does this include a "gesture of goodwill" which is often mentioned in public debate over Cyprus, and which Assistant Secretary Hartman spoke of in his September 26 testimony before the Refugee Subcommittee? And, in practical terms, what kinds of action by Turkey, in the Department's view, would constitute a meaningful "gesture of goodwill"? And what are the possibilities for such a gesture being made before the end of the year? In the Department's view, does such a gesture require the return of a substantial number of refugees to their homes?

Answer: "d) The Secretary's August 19 statement about the need for Turkey to display flexibility and a concern for Greek sensitivities was meant to include possible steps designed to advance the negotiating process. These steps might be made in areas such as refugee return, troop withdrawals, pullback from present lines, and the reopening of Nicosia Airport. The parties themselves must decide what steps or gestures are necessary and meaningful. In this regard, what we meant here were first steps, indicating an intention to negotiate rather than final positions to be taken in the negotiations. Given the uncertainties in the governmental situation in Turkey, it is difficult to estimate when some kind of initial steps or gestures will be made."

e. Also on August 19, Secretary Kissinger said that "we will use our influence in any negotiation to take into full account Greek honor and national dignity." In his October 14 message to Congress, the President also refers to "the honor and dignity of Greece" as a factor in our diplomacy toward the Cyprus problem. What actions or developments, in the Department's view, would "take into full account Greek honor and national dignity"—in terms of a resumption of negotiations, the negotiating process, or a final settlement.

Answer: "e) Only the Greek Government can decide what would satisfy Greek honor and dignity vis-a-vis Cyprus. We would imagine, however, that further indications of Turkey's good faith and progress toward negotiations, are essential prerequisites."

f. What are the Department's views on

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what Assistant Secretary Hartman calls "the guarantee for the eventual outcome", or settlement, of the Cyprus problem?

Answer: "(f) We believe that some system of guarantees, like those written into the 1956-60 negotiations will probably be required but we have no fixed views on what guarantees will be necessary or who the guarantor powers will or should be."

g. What are the Department's views on various proposals for the neutralization and demilitarization of Cyprus?

Answer: "(g) The nature and size of the armed forces in the Republic of Cyprus are matters to be decided by the parties themselves."

(3.) Assess the status of Turkish military forces on Cyprus in terms of their numbers, kinds of units, equipment, maintenance costs, resupply, et cetera.

Answer: "We are in the process of improving our information about the size and status of Turkish military forces on Cyprus. Our best current information is that there are 35-37,000 Turkish troops on the island."

(4.) What is the Department's assessment of reports that Ankara has introduced civilian administrators, laborers, and others from the mainland into the occupied areas of Cyprus?

Answer: "Some civilian administrators, laborers, and others have been sent to Cyprus from the mainland. Our understanding is that most of these people have been assigned to the island on a temporary basis, and have come without their families."

(5.) Assess the stability of the ceasefire line, and the frequency and source of ceasefire violations.

Answer: "The cease-fire line has been stable since mid-August. There have been only a few brief, isolated, and militarily insignificant incidents. According to the UN Forces in Cyprus, which investigate each incident as part of their peace-keeping duties, both sides have at various times provoked minor infractions."

(6.) Comment on recent reports that Turkey has systematically and extensively mined the ceasefire line on Cyprus, and has constructed heavy fortifications or other barriers on or behind this line.

Answer: "The Department does not have precise information regarding the extent to which Turkey has fortified its line of control in the northern region of Cyprus. Construction of some defensive fortifications has been reported, however."

(7.) In the context of explaining American policy toward Cyprus, officials in the Executive Branch have spoken of the need "to protect American interests" in Turkey. Define these interests and their significance to our immediate and longer term national interest and security in the Eastern Mediterranean area.

Answer: "The United States and Turkey share a common interest in preventing Soviet aggression and expansion southward into the Mediterranean. We are both NATO allies, and by participating in this common endeavor, we share basic foreign policy and defense goals. Through this mutuality of interest, we have built common defense installations, are

granted overflight rights and port facilities. It is also in the U.S. interest to have a friendly ally control access to the Black Sea. We welcome continued Turkish membership in CENTO, and Turkish assistance in our common efforts to combat international narcotics trafficking."

(8.) In this regard, define the number, nature, and purposes of American military/intelligence and related installations in Turkey. What is the number of American personnel maintaining and operating these installations? And how many of these are involved in intelligence operations?

Answer: "Turkey and the U.S. maintain one large, two medium, and several smaller common defense installations in Turkey. There are between seven and eight thousand American military personnel working at these installations. Further questions about the number of U.S. personnel assigned to monitoring or intelligence duties should be addressed to the Director of Central Intelligence."

(9.) Define the kinds, categories and levels of economic and military assistance given or projected to the government of Turkey for fiscal years 1973 through 1975.

Answer: "The following table shows military and economic assistance to Turkey for FY 1973 through FY 1975:

	[In millions of dollars]		
	1973	1974	1975 (estimate) ¹
Economic assistance:			
Development loans.....	9.0	0	0
Technical assistance.....	2.8	1.8	1.1
Public Law 480 school lunch.....	6.1	2.8	2.1
Opium agreement.....	5.0	0	0
Total economic.....	22.9	4.6	3.2
Military:			
Credit sales.....	20.0	75.0	90.0
Grant.....	58.5	63.7	80.0
Excess equipment.....	43.9	37.3	35.0
Supply operations.....	10.6	11.4	13.0
Total military.....	133.0	187.4	218.0

¹ Fiscal year 1975 military assistance/sales figures are requested amounts and should not be compared with 1973 and 1974 figures which are actual amounts disbursed.

(10.) On a monthly basis since January 1974, define the volume and kinds of American military shipments to Turkey, and those scheduled or projected for delivery through the end of the current fiscal year.

Answer: "[Department of State estimates put Military Assistance Program deliveries for CY 1974 at \$46,175,000 through September. Foreign Military Sales deliveries total \$43,409,000 during the same period. The combined total is \$89,584,000.]"

(11.) Comment on reports that American military equipment is being or has been, transferred, or sold to Turkey through third parties, such as Iran.

Answer: "Except for unconfirmed reports that some quantity of US-manufactured small arms and ammunition have been sent to Turkey by Idbya, the Department is una-

ware of any military equipment of US origin having been sold or otherwise transferred to Turkey by third countries. The Federal Republic of Germany had until mid-1974 a military assistance and sales program. Similarly, we understand that the Turkish and Italian Governments have recently concluded a commercial sales agreement providing for Turkish purchase of Italian-made aircraft of US design. This transaction was arranged by the Governments of Turkey and Italy, and the US Government was informed in advance about the arrangement."

(12.) Given the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, what is the Department's final conclusion on the legality of continuing military assistance to Turkey, under the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended?

Answer: "Turkey has maintained that its actions were justified as measures consistent with the UN Charter under the 1960 Treaty of Guaranty to which the Government of Turkey, the United Kingdom, Greece and Cyprus are parties. It was clear that Turkey felt its actions were justified and necessary in light of the events which had transpired on Cyprus prior to the Turkish intervention. After carefully weighing the legal and foreign policy considerations, the Administration decided that it was impossible publicly to express a legal conclusion on the issue of Turkey's eligibility for further assistance and sales without undermining our foreign policy objective of persuading Turkey and Greece to enter into direct negotiations for a solution of the Cyprus problem."

(13.) In his September 26 testimony before the Refugee Subcommittee, Assistant Secretary Hartman said:

"And when I saw the Deputy [United Nations] High Commissioner [for Refugees], I said to him, I do not think it is realistic at all for you to be talking only about this period from September 1 through December 31, because when you are talking to these governments, you cannot just come around to them sometime in December and say, look, we have a new requirement now for 1975. While, none of us want to give the impression that we think this is a problem that is not going to be solved by negotiation, I think it is only wise and prudent . . . to hope for the best and plan for the worst."

Elaborate on this statement in terms of the Department's views, as of now, on the time frame for contingency planning, the costs involved in providing relief assistance to the refugees, and the level of support the United States is prepared to give to the UNHCR program. Also, in what other ways is the United States prepared to support rehabilitation and recovery efforts on Cyprus?

Answer: "We understand that the UNHCR's current \$22 million appeal has been met, and that some of this money will be available for relief efforts in 1975. Additional assistance, however, will definitely be necessary for at least 6-12 months and perhaps longer. Accordingly, we are keeping a disaster relief specialist in Cyprus to advise us of relief requirements on a continuing basis and AID is asking Congress in its budget request for an additional \$10 million for the Cyprus relief effort."

TURKEY

1. STATUS OF MAP DELIVERIES

[Dollar amounts in thousands]

Item	January-March 1974		April-June 1974		July-September 1974		Item	January-March 1974		April-June 1974		July-September 1974	
	Quantity	Cost	Quantity	Cost	Quantity	Cost		Quantity	Cost	Quantity	Cost	Quantity	Cost
Fighter F-100.....	33	\$244					Misc boats and craft.....	8	\$221				
Cargo C-130.....	2	8,000					Ship cost sharing.....	449			\$374		\$348
Aircraft mods, AGE and other.....	456			\$1,038		\$785	Ship spare parts.....	42			75		96
Aircraft spare parts.....	691			605		1,546	Total ships.....		712		449		444
Total aircraft.....	9,391			1,643		2,331							

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Item	January-March 1974		April-June 1974		July-September 1974	
	Quantity	Cost	Quantity	Cost	Quantity	Cost
Carr pers armd full track	118	\$2,984	120	\$5,421	21	\$41
Artillery SP 105 mm how	24	448	34	196	31	1,333
Artillery SP other	21		12			
Medium tanks	30		1		100	
Semitrailer, all types	167		1			
Trailers, all types	184		178	40	122	4
Trucks, 1/4-T, all types	149		13	31	5	23
Trucks, 3/4-T, all types					361	
Trucks, 2 1/2-T, all types	147		87	64	37	6
Trucks, 5-T, all types	270		166	22	44	3
Other trucks	37	30	11	65		27
Submachine guns				21		
Other weapons and ordnance eqp		21		78		
106 mm recoilless rifles			57	616		
Weapons spares		241		126		66
107-4.2-in. mortars			18	132		
Automotive supply and eqp. spares		1,093		1,446		1,015
Total vehicles and weapons		4,817		8,259		2,518
Nike missiles and sup eqp		38		172		
Falcon missiles and sup eqp		2		25		10
Tow missiles and sup eqp						14
Missile spare parts		125		129		115
Total missiles		165		326		140
Tel & Tel terminal and trans eqp	32	74		74		
Radios, tactical	248	183	478	560	8	12

Item	January-March 1974		April-June 1974		July-September 1974	
	Quantity	Cost	Quantity	Cost	Quantity	Cost
Radio ground—Air comm eqp	3	\$9				
Radio mbl and transpbl eqp	110	103	48	\$270	101	\$88
Other communications eqp		61		322		124
Communication eqp spares		96		95		100
Total communications eqp		526		1,321		324
Military bridges			4	483		
Major construction eqp items	2					
Tractors crawler and wheeled			1	1		
Tool kits and sets	1		1		3	1
Fork lift trucks					2	
Misc other support eqp		714		368		257
Generators 30kW and larger			2		6	2
Other supplies		52		16		134
POL, gases and fuels						1
Total other equipment and supplies		766		870		395
Repair and rehab		219		4,270		3,857
Training		706		116		480
Other services		164		430		510
Other ammo and components				4		22
Total ammunition				4		22
Total program		17,466		17,688		11,021

2. STATUS OF FMS DELIVERIES

Fighter F-4E			4	\$13,589
Aircraft mods, AGE and other	\$627	\$838		2,229
Aircraft spare parts	439	887		1,961
Total aircraft	1,065	1,725		17,779
Destroyers	2	450		
Submarines	7	1,150		
Auxiliary ocean tugs	1	45		
Ship spare parts		709		263
Total ships	2,354		263	
Carr pers armd full track		132	4,577	
Other weapons and ordnance			176	25
Total vehicles and weapons		4,753		25
Other ammo and components		59	268	385
Artillery proj 5-inch and over	1,391	154	723	32
Artillery charges	1,638	80		350
Bombs	22,400	127	9,440	274
Total ammunition		420	574	250

Rockeye			218	\$697
Missile spare parts				6
Total missiles				704
Other communications eqp			\$9	68
Radios, tactical		\$67		
Communication eqp spares		14	29	38
Total communication equipment		81	39	106
Tool kits and sets			8	4
Misc other support eqp		216	21	38
Other supplies		27	36	
Total other eqp		243	61	38
Repair and rehab			2,042	
Supply operations		73		510
Training and training aids		18	3	9,331
Other services		8	14	237
Country total		4,262	9,638	29,509

Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.

THE NEED FOR LAND USE PLANNING

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, we in New England are rightly proud of the many aspects of our region. But I think it fair to say that we are most proud of our land. No words can adequately describe these lands; their warmth, beauty and tradition mean something different to each observer. Yet I think all would agree that these lands are the heart of New England's heritage, the soul of New England's existence.

Now our land is threatened. The slow, methodical pace of development is taking a heavy toll. In December's Country Journal, Mr. John C. Page carefully examines this rueful course of events. And though his article, entitled "New England's Manmade Land-Use Dilemma," deals directly with our region, it speaks eloquently to the kinds of problems which face communities throughout the Nation. I therefore recommend it to my colleagues with the hope that it will strengthen our collective resolve to enact meaningful land use planning legislation early in the 94th Congress.

The failure of the 93d Congress to pass this legislation will stand as an indelible blemish on our record. The administra-

tion, too, shares this shame, for its previously stated support unfortunately foundered at the key moment in last winter's House debate. Meanwhile the toll mounts.

Mr. President, rhetoric is the stock in trade of every politician. But no amount of rhetoric can do justice to the need for this Nation to care for its lands. We are after all the stewards of these lands; if we abuse them, we will suffer—so will our children. All of which begs the question: if we will not care for our lands, who will?

I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Page's article be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Country Journal, December 1974]
NEW ENGLAND'S MANMADE LAND-USE DILEMMA
(By John C. Page)

One of the characteristics of the human race is that we are forever trying to apply yesterday's ideas or tools to today's problems. Nowhere is this more apparent than in our approach to the use of land here in New England.

For a couple of centuries the value of land was based pretty much on what it would produce in the way of food and tim-

ber. Land sold for prices that reflected these uses. Property taxes were levied according to productive capacity of the land. Although there probably never was and never will be a time when landowners, as a whole, didn't think they were overtaxed on their land, at least there was some logic to basing taxes on productive capacity.

Then the planners began to hang up maps showing how the great megalopolis was about to engulf the coastline from Portland, Maine to Richmond, Virginia and stretch inland far enough to include most of New England in the checkered areas on their charts. Parts of New England were becoming very un-New Englandlike. Pressures from the inner cities were forcing people out into the boondocks: they wanted elbow room, had the money, and were willing to pay for it, and the price they were willing to pay was greater than the productive capacity of the land.

Now, when people started to pay more for land than they could hope to derive from it as a producer of food and fiber, the folk who assess taxes made note of this. The appetite of our society for tax money to provide services is insatiable. Everybody wants services like better roads, better schools, sewer and water lines, to say nothing of what we call "human services programs." So those who are trying to make a living in farming and forestry saw the property taxes go up on their land. Its assessment

for tax purposes is now based on what it will sell for, rather than on what it will produce. We call this "fair market value." But some tax people are so obsessed with "fair market value" that they couldn't possibly understand what "fair taxes" might be.

The families that have farmed land and logged it for generations, and would like to continue to do so, find themselves in a dilemma. How to pay property taxes on "fair market value" when the land itself won't generate enough money for the taxes? How to keep the land in agriculture and forestry from one generation to another when the opportunity to cash in for a bundle is forever staring its owners in the face? How to transfer a farm or a forest to the next generation at a price that will permit the younger generation to pay for it from the productive capacity of the land, and still not be forced to sell it to pay estate taxes which will probably be assessed on its "fair market value"?

The people who come to the country and pay higher prices than the productive capacity of the land warrants are also in a dilemma. They came here and paid these prices, presumably, to become a part of rural New England—to see hillside on which cattle are grazing, open pastures, and quaint little villages with the independent Yankee running the local store. Few of them have any intention of farming or of using the forests to support their investment. What they see increasingly, however, is the postcard New England that drew them here being eaten up by their own action and by the actions of others who have similar desires.

These people buy up farms at nonfarm prices and lament that agriculture is going to the dogs. Yet they can't seem to understand that their own collective actions are bringing this about. These people rapidly become acquainted with the fair-market-value concept, which is the basis of the tax bills they receive, and they have to dig up the money from sources other than agricultural or forestry pursuits, or—if they cannot—they have to sell out.

A lot has been said and written about land speculators who are interested only in buying land, holding it long enough to escape taxation through the capital-gains loophole, and leaving with their pockets lined. Those who are trying to hang on and make a go of it on the land usually regard the speculator as the other guy, who is out to make a fast buck.

To be realistic, speculators aren't always the other guys. Actually, anyone who has a clear title to a piece of land in this economic climate is forced to be a speculator of sorts, unless he has a bankroll to pay the ever-increasing taxes and hold on, regardless of whether or not the productive capacity of the land will carry his investment.

Yesterday's ideas, when applied to today's realities in New England, aren't working. How long will it be before we are really a part of the checkered area on the map of megalopolis? Don't blame the speculators and the real estate men, who are operating by the rules of today's ball game. Don't blame the farmer who sells out to someone from "away" for two or three times what his son, or another aspiring farmer, can pay for a farm, and still operate it as a farm and pay for it from farming.

Blame all of us for our unwillingness to face up to the situation we are in and to use the common-sense tools available to us. For too long we have looked upon the deed to a piece of land as a license to do as we damn please with it, without regard to the consequences to our neighbors, to our municipalities, or to society as a whole. There is no felt obligation on the part of most landowners to look forward a generation or two and make note of the fact that we will need land to produce food, and forests for lumber and paper. We continue to build houses on

our best flat farmland and let the hillside—which would be good places for houses—grow up to brush. We put bulldozers to work on fragile uplands because they happen to be near ski areas and destroy land that does well for forestry but that creates nothing but problems when developed.

We have, so far, been unwilling to commit our land to a use on a permanent basis that would tie the value of the land to that use and stabilize the taxes to that use.

We have been unwilling to offer landowners the simple right to commit their land, or part of their land, to permanent agricultural or forest use and to be taxed accordingly. We have, basically, been unwilling to separate development rights from ownership rights for other uses and to tax land, accordingly, even where landowners would be willing to make such commitments.

What we fail to realize is that when a buyer comes here and pays \$2,000 an acre for a piece of land, when it may be worth \$500 for farming or \$50 for forestry, he has committed his dollars to developing that land in order to come out with his economic shirt, over the long run. Would he pay \$2,000 an acre for that land without the right to carve it up and plant houses on it?

If a farmer wants to keep a farm or a forest in the family and have its value and its taxes—including estate taxes—set accordingly, then he should have the opportunity to do this. If he chooses to retain the development rights and the higher value that would accompany them, then let that value be the "fair market value" for taxation.

Most states have passed some stop-gap laws and regulations that allow temporary tax relief for temporary agreements with the local tax authorities. But there is no long-term commitment of land to any particular use, and it is only a matter of time until the landowner gets the big offer he can't resist. In some states, the seller is obliged to reimburse the municipality for taxes forgiven in prior years, but this is peanuts compared with the long green that the land will bring for development.

It is not always high property taxes that force a sale, but more often the huge prices offered for the land. It isn't too critical whether the taxes are \$10 an acre per year or \$30 an acre per year if land worth \$500 for farming can be sold for \$2,000 an acre. The high tax may be unfair, and really too high, but it is not as powerful a factor in forcing a sale as the enormous offers that do not reflect the productive capacity of the land.

If a local town reduces taxes, thinking that this will prevent a change in land use and keep land from passing into the hands of people who pay so much they have to cut it up and develop it, then that town is naive indeed. If we face the economic facts of life, the stabilization of land will come about only when land is worth as much for food and fiber production as it is for development. People are not that hungry yet, and before they are I fear they will be asking, "What happened?" Remember, New England produces only two and a half per cent of the food we use in the United States, and we could replace this much food easily from other parts of the country. But only if they don't do what we are doing here.

People who pay the long prices aren't dummies. They have every intention of making a bundle and avoiding the payment of income taxes at resale time through the capital-gains loophole. Unfortunately, however, what capital-gains taxes they do pay go to federal and state treasuries instead of to local treasuries, where land taxes have long been the major source of financing local needs. It would seem reasonable that taxes on land gains should stay on the local level, but locals have less than no chance of pulling this off.

Another example of using the wrong tools can be observed by looking at the zoning

ordinances and plans which towns have prepared at great expense—both in dollars and in the hundreds of hours of time and effort expended by countless enlightened citizens.

Except in rare instances, land is not indicated on these plans as agricultural or forest land, but rather as "rural residential," where both farming and residential development are allowed. Many of these plans and zoning ordinances are not what the people who work on them know is needed, but are proved by citizens who can be, or think they can be, affected and by people who make no effort to understand the problems of the present, to say nothing of the future.

The gist of too many of these regulations, which can be voted out when they don't work, is that only one house can be built on five acres or on twenty-five acres. All New England needs is one house on each five acres.

If we make the little checkered areas on our megalopolis map the right size, we can forget all about sound land use and put a house right in the center of each little check and then build roads to each house, and everybody can be employed fixing these roads and keeping the snow plowed. Such zoning does nothing but pay lip service to agricultural and forestry pursuits on a long-term basis.

Once we get a house on every five acres, it won't be long before the five-acre chunks are broken down into five one-acre chunks with a house planted in each of them. Then we really will be part of megalopolis. The people who come here to enjoy the New England countryside will find the countryside gone, and they will start looking for a new countryside to escape to.

Our major error is in not deciding now which land is to be left in forests, which land is to be reserved to produce food for our expanding population, and which land will be devoted to the building of houses, businesses, and factories—and then sticking with our decision. Some countries did this centuries ago. But this cannot and will not be done here if everybody has, as a part of ownership rights, the right to do as they please with their land, regardless of its effect on today's and tomorrow's society.

There is still enough rock-ribbed Yankee conservatism in my veins to make me believe that there is nothing wrong, morally or otherwise, with buying land at one price and selling it at another at a profit. But I cannot concoct a logical reason why only half of the profit in a sale should be subject to income taxes as a capital gain, when the majority of the people who earn their living by the sweat of their brows are taxed on all they make.

Nor do I think it prudent to destroy our good food-producing land or our best forest land, when we have plenty of other land suitable for developing. Since the majority of people alive today will live to see our world population climb from just under four billion to more than six billion people, and since the likelihood of increasing food production at the same rate is not promising, and since half the people in the world are already underfed and undernourished, we had better pay some attention to preserving our remaining productive land—which covers only ten to twelve per cent of the earth's surface. If ordinary people cannot foresee the necessity of preserving good land for food production, then we'd better make it a matter of national policy and, whenever such land exists earmark a reasonable amount of it for food production. Otherwise it may be too late before the need dawns on the average citizen.

As a practical matter, it would be better and more palatable if the regulation of land use were to be accomplished at local levels where the people really know (or could find out if they wished) what the land is best suited for. Federal and state guidelines

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hostile forces which threaten the security of sea areas vital to our national interests.

In spite of new strategies and renewed efforts, however, we still need ships to be a Navy. And we must have new ships, of the proper kinds and in the correct balance of numbers and types if we are to carry out our undiminished level of commitments against the threat of a steadily expanding Soviet Navy. We have been decommissioning ships faster than we have been building new ones. And although today we can accomplish the naval tasks of our national strategy, in some areas it is only at the barest margin of success. As Soviet maritime capabilities continue to increase, it is clear to me, as it must be apparent to you that it is necessary to reverse the declining trend of the force levels of the U.S. Navy.

With the shipbuilding plans we now have programmed, we can reverse that downward trend.

But the key to the success of any strategy is the human element. No matter how new the ships, how modern the aircraft, how sophisticated the weapons systems, we cannot realize their full potential unless we have a dedicated corps of true professionals to maintain and operate them.

Although we ask the Navy League for help, need the support of the Department of Defense, and require Congressional approval to build our forces, the responsibility for making a navy out of hardware rests squarely on our shoulders, for it is people alone who can make the hardware work.

It is in recognition of the people factor in our formula for success that I have put my initial emphasis and greatest stress on personnel programs—and this includes Reserves. And paramount among our efforts in this area is a concentration on our leadership.

We must return to fundamentals.

Technology is expanding at a mind boggling rate, reducing weapons systems to obsolescence virtually as they leave the drawing board. But those human qualities of dedication, loyalty, integrity and compassion have not lost one shred of their basic value since the dawn of history, and it is upon continued recognition of the part these human values play in any military organization that we must focus our attention.

I have tended to range widely today in my remarks, from international politics to human ethics, from hardware to geography, but I can sum up the substance of our policy for the charting of the Navy's course through these immediate years of trial and concern in a single phrase: fleet readiness.

Fleet readiness is our primary objective. For no matter how tough the task, how severe the threat, and how sparse the resources, the United States Navy must—and will—always be ready to carry out that mission upon which the security of the American people so profoundly depends.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted as follows:

To Mr. JONES of North Carolina (at the request of Mr. O'NEILL), for today, on account of official business.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. MARTIN of North Carolina) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. KEMP, for 15 minutes, today.

Mrs. HECKLER of Massachusetts, for 15 minutes, today.

Mr. MILLER, for 15 minutes, today.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. THORNTON) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. GONZALEZ, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. DRINAN, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. REUSS, for 20 minutes, today.

Mr. DULSKI, for 10 minutes, today.

Ms. HOLTZMAN, for 10 minutes, today.

Mr. CARNEY of Ohio, for 10 minutes, today.

Mr. MOAKLEY, for 15 minutes, today.

Mr. KOCH, for 10 minutes, today.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

Mr. DELLUMS, and to include extraneous matter notwithstanding the fact that it exceeds 2 pages of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD and is estimated by the Public Printer to cost \$903.50.

Mr. FASCELL, and to include extraneous matter notwithstanding the fact that it exceeds 2 pages of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD and is estimated by the Public Printer to cost \$1,112.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. MARTIN of North Carolina) and to include extraneous material:)

Mr. WYMAN in two instances.

Mr. HOSMER in three instances.

Mr. SHRIVER in two instances.

Mr. O'BRIEN.

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin in two instances.

Mr. PARRIS in two instances.

Mr. RHODES.

Mr. KEMP in two instances.

Mr. ROBISON of New York.

Mrs. HECKLER of Massachusetts.

Mr. BUCHANAN in two instances.

Mr. BRAY in three instances.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. THORNTON) and to include extraneous material:)

Mr. FOLEY in three instances.

Mr. ANDERSON of California in four instances.

Mr. RARICK in three instances.

Mr. GONZALEZ in three instances.

Mr. MOORHEAD of Pennsylvania.

Mr. FISHER.

Mr. LONG of Maryland.

Mr. MATHIS of Georgia in two instances.

Mr. JONES of Tennessee.

Mr. FRASER in five instances.

Mr. HARRINGTON in five instances.

Mr. FLOOD.

Mr. LEGGETT.

Mr. HAMILTON in two instances.

Mr. MOAKLEY.

Mr. VANIK.

Mr. MADDEN.

Mr. ZABLOCKI in three instances.

ENROLLED BILLS AND A JOINT RESOLUTION SIGNED

Mr. HAYS, from the Committee on House Administration, reported that that committee had examined and found truly enrolled a joint resolution of the

House of the following titles, which were thereupon signed by the Speaker:

H.R. 13167. An act to provide for the establishment of the Clara Barton National Historic Site, Md.; John Day Fossil Beds National Monument, Oreg.; Knife River Indian Villages National Historic Site, Mass.; Tuskegee Institute National Historic Site, Ala.; Martin Van Buren National Historic Site, N.Y.; and Sewall-Beimont House National Historic Site, Washington, District of Columbia; and for other purposes;

H.R. 15736. An act to authorize, enlarge, and repair various Federal reclamation projects and programs, and for other purposes; and

H.J. Res. 1163. Joint resolution making further continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 1975, and for other purposes.

BILLS AND A JOINT RESOLUTION PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT

Mr. HAYS, from the Committee on House Administration, reported that that committee did on the following dates present to the President, for his approval, bills and a joint resolution of the House of the following titles:

On October 16, 1974:

H.J. Res. 163. Joint resolution making further continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 1975, and for other purposes.

On October 17, 1974:

H.R. 6624. An act for the relief of Alvin V. Burt, Jr., Eileen Wallace Kennedy Pope, and David Douglas Kennedy, a minor;

H.R. 6642. An act to suspend the duties on certain bicycle parts and accessories until the close of December 31, 1976, and for other purposes;

H.R. 7768. An act for the relief of Nolan Sharp;

H.R. 7780. An act to extend for an additional temporary period the existing suspension of duties on certain classifications of yarns of silk, and for other purposes;

H.R. 11221. An act to increase deposit insurance from \$20,000 to \$40,000, to provide full insurance for public unit deposits of \$100,000 per account, to establish a National Commission on Electronic Fund Transfers, and for other purposes;

H.R. 11251. An act to amend the Tariff Schedules of the United States to provide for the duty-free entry of methanol imported for use as fuel, and for other purposes.

H.R. 11452. An act to correct an anomaly in the rate of duty applicable to crude feathers and downs, and for other purposes;

H.R. 11830. An act to suspend the duty on synthetic rutile until the close of June 30, 1977;

H.R. 12085. An act to suspend until the close of June 30, 1975, the duty on certain carboxymethyl cellulose salts, and for other purposes;

H.R. 12281. An act to continue until the close of June 30, 1975, the suspension of duties on certain forms of copper, and for other purposes;

H.R. 13561. An act to amend the Intercoastal Shipping Act, 1933;

H.R. 13631. An act suspend for a temporary period the import duty on certain horses, and for other purposes;

H.R. 14225. An act to extend the authorizations of appropriations in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 for 1 year, to transfer the Rehabilitation Services Administration to the Office of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, to make certain technical and clarifying amendments, and for other purposes; to amend the Randolph-Sheppard Act for the blind; to strengthen the program authorized thereunder; and to provide for the convening of a White House Conference on Handicapped Individuals;

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H.R. 14597. An act to increase the limit on dues for United States membership in the International Criminal Police Organization;

H.R. 15148. An act to extend the time limit for the award of certain military decorations;

H.R. 15427. An act to amend the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 to provide financial assistance to the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and for other purposes;

H.R. 15540. An act to extend for 1 year the authorization for appropriations to implement title I of the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972;

H.R. 15643. An act to reorganize public postsecondary education in the District of Columbia, establish a Board of Trustees, authorize and direct the Board of Trustees to consolidate the existing local institutions of public postsecondary education into single Land-Grant University of the District of Columbia, direct the Board of Trustees to administer the University of the District of Columbia, and for other purposes;

H.R. 16857. An act to provide for emergency allotment lease and transfer of tobacco allotments or quotas for 1974 in certain disaster areas in North Carolina; and

H.R. 17027. An act to amend the National Visitor Center Facilities Act of 1968.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. THORNTON. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to.

The SPEAKER. In accordance with Senate Concurrent Resolution 120, the Chair declares the House adjourned until 12 o'clock noon on November 18 next.

Thereupon (at 4 o'clock and 15 minutes p.m.), pursuant to Senate Concurrent Resolution 120, the House adjourned until Monday, November 18, 1974, at 12 o'clock noon.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS,
ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

2877. A letter from the Corporation Agent, Legion of Valor of the United States of America, Inc., transmitting the financial

statement of the Legion of Valor for the fiscal year ending April 30, 1974, pursuant to section 14(b) of Public Law 224, 84th Congress; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

2878. A letter from the Under Secretary of Agriculture, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to make advances of money to chiefs of field parties; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. YOUNG of Texas: Committee on Rules. House Resolution 1456. Resolution providing for the consideration of House Joint Resolution 1167. Joint resolution making further continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 1975, and for other purposes (Report No. 93-1470). Referred to the House Calendar.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. BRINKLEY:

H.R. 17426. A bill to provide for the establishment of a national advisory commission to develop a national plan for the control of epilepsy and its consequences; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. FORSYTHE:

H.R. 17427. A bill to prohibit any increase in the price of certain consumer commodities by any retailer once a price is placed on any such commodity by such retailer, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. MCKINNEY:

H.R. 17428. A bill to provide financial assistance to regulated electric utilities to reduce the increases in electric utility rates caused by increases in the price of residual oil; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. MOSHER (for himself, Mr. MOOREHEAD of California, and Mr. O'BRIEN):

H.R. 17429. A bill to require in all cases court orders for the interception of communications by electronic and other devices, for the entering of any residence, for the opening of any mail, for the inspection or procurement of certain records, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SPENCE:

H.R. 17430. A bill to amend the Solid Waste Disposal Act to authorize the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to make loan guarantee and interest subsidy payments to certain governmental units to assist them in carrying out projects for the generation of energy from solid wastes; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. ULLMAN:

H.R. 17431. A bill to suspend until the close of June 30, 1976, the duties on polyvinyl chloride resins; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. MAHON:

H.J. Res. 1167. Joint resolution making further continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 1975, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Appropriations.

By Mr. QUINN:

H.J. Res. 1168. Joint resolution to require the Watergate Special Prosecution Force to make available to the public a report on all information it has concerning Richard M. Nixon in offenses against the United States; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. LEGGETT (for himself, Mr. JOHN L. BURTON, Mr. HECHLER of West Virginia, and Mrs. SULLIVAN):

H. Con. Res. 678. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress with respect to decontrol of certain domestic crude oil; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. JARMAN:

H.R. 17432. A bill for the relief of Ammeneh Amir-Bagheri; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. CHARLES WILSON of Texas:

H.R. 17433. A bill for the relief of Jung Shin Yu; to the Committee on the Judiciary.